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ST . L UKE ’S AND THE FAILURE OF THE
EFFICIENCIES DEFENSE
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The changes brought about by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) have prompted several scholars to call for
a reconsideration of the efficiencies defense in healthcare mergers under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The ACA implemented several changes to
increase quality of care that inherently incentivized entities to integrate.
This integration, in theory, increases efficiencies and lowers costs. After
the ACA was passed, there was an upsurge of healthcare mergers.
Recently, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) (collectively, the “Agencies”) have successfully challenged
healthcare mergers for violating antitrust laws. 1 These cases show a
tension between antitrust law and ACA objectives. One such case is St.
Alphonsus Medical Center – Nampa, Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Systems (“St.
Luke’s”), 2 in which the defendant unsuccessfully argued that merger
efficiencies would overcome the potential for the merger’s anticompetitive
consequences. The treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s has provoked a
call to action from scholars, who argue for a reconsideration of the
defense.
Although some scholars argue for more expansive treatment of
the efficiencies defense, this Article argues that courts are properly

∗ J.D., The University of Tennessee College of Law; B.A., The University of Tennessee.
The Author will be a first-year associate at Bass Berry & Sims PLC in September 2018.
The Author would like to thank Professor Maurice Stucke for his comments and advice
on earlier drafts of this article.

In 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined Aetna’s proposed
acquisition of Humana and Anthem’s acquisition of Cigna. See also Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (2016).

1

2

778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2014).
737

738

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

evaluating efficiencies in light of empirical data, the Agencies’ preliminary
review of proposed mergers, and the existing burden-shifting framework
that courts employ under the Clayton Act. Section II of this Article
provides an overview of the current state of healthcare consolidation.
Section III explains how the courts currently apply Section 7 of the
Clayton Act to antitrust matters involving healthcare mergers. Section IV
provides an overview of the St. Luke’s decision, which is critical to
understanding the arguments for and against changing the courts’
treatment of efficiencies. Section V presents scholarly arguments in favor
of expanding the efficiencies defense in the analysis of healthcare mergers.
Section VI counters that the efficiencies defense is properly limited by the
courts. Finally, Section VII of this Article concludes that the courts’
current standard is necessary to protect both competition and quality of
health services.
II.

THE ACA, CONSOLIDATION & ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

In 2010, Congress passed the ACA, 3 vastly changing the landscape
of the healthcare industry. Although the ACA had several objectives, its
overarching goal was to improve quality and efficiency of healthcare
services. 4 One way to achieve this goal was to transition from a fee-forservice payment structure to value-based reimbursement. 5 Pre-ACA,
health systems predominantly operated under a fee-for-service structure,
under which each service was reimbursed separately. 6 This structure

3

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).

4 See 124 Stat. 119,

§§ 2717, 2718; Cory H. Howard, The Federal Trade Commission and Federal
Courts' Scrutiny of Healthcare Mergers: Do Inflexible Standards and Increased Scrutiny Stifle the
Legislative Intent of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act?, 18 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH
L.J. 67, 69–70 (2015).
124 Stat. 119, §§ 3001, 3006, 3007. For a broad overview of value-based purchasing
programs, see Bruce Fried & Jeremy Sherer, ValueBased Reimbursement: The Rock Thrown
Into The Health Care Pond, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Jul. 8, 2016), https://www.
healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160708.055764/full/.
5

6

124 Stat. 119, § 1115A(a)(2)(B); Fried & Sherer, supra note 5.
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inherently incentivizes physicians to provide excessive care. 7 In an effort
to combat unnecessary care and expenditures, the ACA created valuebased payment systems, in which reimbursement depends on weighing
health outcomes against overall costs. 8 The transition to value-based
purchasing “require[s] sophisticated management expertise and significant
capital investments.” 9 The push towards quality-based reimbursement
thus encouraged entities to consolidate to provide more complete care.
As part of the move towards value-based purchasing, the ACA created
accountable care organizations (“ACOs”), networks of providers that
work together to service 5,000 patients or more. 10 ACOs are accountable
for providing quality services to the population, and when they achieve
their quality goals, they share in the savings they obtain through the ACA’s
Medicare Shared Savings Program (“MSSP”). 11 Because ACOs provided
strong payment incentives for providers to create integrated, efficient
networks, ACOs enhanced vertical consolidation, i.e. hospitals acquiring
physician groups. 12 After the ACA went into effect, market pressure to

7

Fried & Sherer, supra note 5.

124 Stat. 119, §§ 3001, 3006. See also Thomas L. Greaney, The Tangled Web: Integration,
Exclusivity, and Market Power in Provider Contracting, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 59, 60
(2014).

8

3 HEALTH CARE 2020: CONSOLIDATION, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION 2 (2016).
9

10

124 Stat. 119, § 1899.

Accountable Care Organizations, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES (May
5, 2017), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/.
See also 124 Stat. 119, § 3022.
11

Greaney, supra note 8, at 60. While this article focuses on consolidation generally, it is
important to note that ACOs pose special antitrust problems and have separate guidance
from the Agencies. The Agencies issued a policy statement creating safety zones for
ACOs that meet safe harbors. See Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Statement of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating
in the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,026 (Oct. 28, 2011). ACOs
with a common service and a market share of 30% of each common service are inside
the safety zone and do not risk antitrust violations. Id. at 67,028.

12

740

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

cut expenses and improve quality further escalated the existing volume of
mergers and acquisitions. 13 This escalation continues as smaller entities
merge with larger systems in an effort to maintain financial stability. 14
Before the ACA, there were roughly 1,113 hospital mergers
between 1998 and 2012, averaging 74 per year. 15 After the ACA passed,
there was an uptick in consolidation within the industry. In 2016, alone,
102 hospital merger and purchase transactions were announced, an
increase of 55% since 2010. 16 The Agencies responded to this increase by
bringing more enforcement actions. In the wake of this “merger mania,”
FTC Commissioner Brill clarified that “the ACA is not a free pass to avoid
FTC regulation” and pointed out that antitrust enforcement is as crucial
now as ever in facilitating healthcare markets. 17 In reviewing antitrust
actions concerning mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, courts
apply a burden-shifting framework. 18 Several scholars argue that the
courts’ treatment of efficiencies within this framework is at odds with
ACA intent. The interplay of antitrust and healthcare laws creates several

Molly Ebraheim, Antitrust and Hospital Mergers: Uniqueness and Consistency in Market
Definition Analysis, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 337, 337 (2017).

13

Deloitte predicts that only 50% of the health systems operating in 2014 will be
independent by 2024. The great consolidation: The potential for rapid consolidation of health systems,
DELOITTE (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/life-sciences-and-healthcare/articles/great-consolidation-health-systems.html.
14

Trendwatch Chartbook 2016: Trends Affecting Hospitals and Health Systems, AMERICAN
HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION (2016), http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/chartbook/
index.shtml.
15

Hospital Merger and Acquisition Activity Continues Upward Trend, According to Kaufman Hall
Analysis, HEALTH SYSTEM MANAGEMENT (Jan. 24, 2017), http://health-systemmanagement.advanceweb.com/hospital-merger-and-acquisition-activity-continuesupward-trend-according-to-kaufman-hall-analysis/.
16

Lori Lustrin, Antitrust’s Attempt at Healthy Competition in Health Care, LAW360 (Mar. 23,
2015),
https://www.bilzin.com/we-think-big/insights/publications/2015/03/
antitrusts-attempt-at-healthy-competition-in-healt.
17

18

United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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questions about whether to change the courts’ analysis of efficiencies
under Section 7.
III.

APPLICATION OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT TO
MERGERS

Before discussing the relevant arguments for change, it is first
necessary to provide an overview of the standard courts use when
assessing potential Clayton Act violations of merging entities. Section 7
of the Clayton Act prohibits a merger where the effect may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. 19 It is
important to note that the plaintiff does not have to prove anticompetitive
effects with certainty but rather that the merger has an appreciable danger
of anticompetitive consequences. 20 Presently, courts analyze mergers
under a burden-shifting framework, in which the plaintiff has the initial
burden to establish that the merger will produce “undue concentration in
the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area.” 21
To satisfy this burden, the plaintiff must first define the relevant
market, consisting of both the product market and geographic market. 22
Absent direct evidence of market power, market definition is important to
the court’s analysis because it determines the defendant’s market share,
thus aiding in the court’s assessment of an entity’s post-merger power. 23
To determine the product market, the plaintiff implements a hypothetical
monopolist test to find reasonably interchangeable substitute products, if

19

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018). See also 2-9 Treatise on Health Care Law, § 9.04 (2017).

20

United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963).

Baker Hughes, Inc.,908 F.2d at 982; FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (quoting Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363) (“[T]he government must show that
the merger would produce ‘a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and [would] result[ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that
market’”).
21

22

United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974).

23

Phila Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
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any, that limit the hypothetical monopolist’s ability to implement a small
but significant non-transitory increase in price. 24 To determine the
relevant geographic market, the plaintiff employs a similar test, looking to
geographic alternatives where consumers may reasonably turn for the
same products or services. 25
After defining the relevant market, the plaintiff determines the
defendant’s market share along with the market share of other industry
actors to show the potential power of the post-merger entity. 26 A plaintiff
can sometimes establish a prima facie case by relying solely on the
defendant’s market share. 27
The plaintiff determines industry
concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) Test,
which is “calculated by summing the squares of the individual firms’
market shares,” thus giving proportional weight to larger market shares. 28
Mergers resulting in un-concentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse
competitive effects. 29 Under the Agencies’ 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), mergers resulting in highly concentrated
markets involving an HHI increase by 100 to 200 points raise concerns,
and HHI increases beyond 200 points are presumed to enhance market
power. 30 The plaintiff may also look to unilateral or coordinated effects
of the firms. 31 Unilateral effects arise where a merger diminishes
competition, and the merged entity can unilaterally exercise market power

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 784 (citing Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI,
546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2008)).
24

25Id.
26

United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1990).

FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 at 716 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Syufy Enters, 903 F.2d at
664.
27

28

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 786.

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 5.3 (2010) [hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
29

30

Id.

31

Id. at §§ 6–7.
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in a variety of contexts, such as raising prices or suppressing output. 32
Coordinated effects, on the other hand, occur where a merger increases
the probability that firms will coordinate their interactions in a way that
harms customers. 33
Finally, the plaintiff may also look to barriers to entry. 34 Ease of
entry into a market may lessen some of the concerns that the post-merging
entity will reduce competition in a given market. 35 Entry into the market
must be timely, likely, and sufficient to counteract the anticompetitive
effects of a merger. 36 If, after presentation of its case, the plaintiff satisfies
its initial burden, there arises a presumption that the merger is
anticompetitive. 37 The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut such
presumption. 38
Defendants typically rely on a broad defense, using evidence
showing that the market share statistics inaccurately account for the
merger’s likely effects on competition. 39 Defendants also commonly
contest market definition, since it is integral in determining the defendant’s
market share. 40 Finally, defendants can argue that the merger produces

32

Id. at § 6.

33

Id. at § 7.

34

Id. at § 9.

Id.; see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532–33 (1973); Baker
Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 987; Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating through the
Fog of Vertical Merger Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the
Clayton Act, 91 WASH. L. REV. 199, 238–39 (2016).

35

36

MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 9.

37

Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 983.

38United

States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 631 (1974); Olin Corp. v.
FTC, 986 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1993); California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837,
842 (9th Cir. 1989).
United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); United States v. Anthem,
Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 192 (D.D.C. 2017).

39

40

MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, § 4.
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efficiencies that overcome the potential for anticompetitive
consequences. 41 According to the Guidelines, “a primary benefit of
mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant
efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to
compete, which may result in lower prices, improved quality, enhanced
service, or new products.” 42 Merger efficiencies must be verifiable,
merger-specific, and sufficient to show that the merger will not be
anticompetitive. 43 Courts have often ruled in favor of the merging parties
because of the plaintiff’s failure to prove its prima facie case; however,
once the presumption that the merger is anticompetitive is in place,
efficiencies have never been sufficient through early 2018 to overcome
it. 44 The courts’ lack of robust analysis of healthcare efficiencies, in
particular, has spawned some to argue for a clearer, reconsidered standard.
For these scholars, the linchpin of their arguments is St. Luke’s.
IV.

OVERVIEW OF S T . L UKE ’S

In 2012, St. Luke’s, an emergency clinic in Nampa, sought to
acquire Saltzer, the largest specialty physician group in Idaho. St.
Alphonsus, the only hospital in Nampa, unsuccessfully sought to enjoin
the merger. 45 After the district court denied St. Alphonsus’ preliminary
injunction, the FTC and the state of Idaho intervened to enjoin the
merger. The district court found that the Clayton Act prohibited the
merger, 46 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling. 47 The district court
determined that the relevant product market consisted of adult primary

41

Id. § 10 (2010).

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789.

St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 181363, at
*10–11.
45

46

Id.

47

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 789.
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care physician services, and that the city of Nampa was the relevant
geographic market. 48
Central to the plaintiffs’ prima facie case was the post-merger HHI
of 6,219 with an increase of 1,607, which was far above the Guidelines’
suggested thresholds for anticompetitive findings. 49 The plaintiffs also
pointed to the ability of the post-merger entity to negotiate higher
reimbursement rates with insurers, which was ultimately harmful to
consumers. 50 Furthermore, the plaintiffs argued that entry into the market
was historically difficult and would not be timely to counteract the
anticompetitive effects of the acquisition. 51 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
district court’s finding that the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to
obtain the presumption that the merger would be anticompetitive. 52
Upon rebuttal, St. Luke’s argued that the distinct procompetitive
benefits of the merger were sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs’ case. 53
The Ninth Circuit was skeptical towards the use of the efficiencies
defense, observing that the Supreme Court has never expressly approved
of it. 54 The court noted that four other circuits suggested that efficiencies
could rebut a presumption of illegality. 55 Of these circuits, however, none
have found that the argued efficiencies were sufficient to overcome the
plaintiff’s case. 56

48

Id. at 784–86.

49

Id. at 786 (citing ProMedica, 749 F.3d at 568).

50

Id.

51

Id. at 787–88.

52

Id. at 786.

53

Id. at 788.

54

Id. (citing Brown Shoe, Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962)).

55

Id. at 789.

56

Id.
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St. Luke’s urged that the merger comported with the goal of
integrated care and risk-based reimbursement, which would provide cost
savings and better care for consumers. 57 St. Luke’s also argued that
providing physicians access to St. Luke’s electronic medical records system
would benefit patients. 58 The court found that the defendant must clearly
demonstrate that the merger enhance competition through efficiencies. 59
Further, in a highly concentrated market, proof of “extraordinary
efficiencies” was necessary. 60 Even though the district court conceded
that the merger would improve the delivery of health care in Nampa, it
held that efficiencies would not prevent the exercise of market power after
the merger. 61 Moreover, the court distinguished between the goal of
moving toward integrated care and actually showing that such care was
certain to result. 62 Ultimately, the court held that St. Luke’s failed to show
that the efficiencies rebutted the plaintiff’s case. 63 After the St. Luke’s
decision, there was an uptick in academia focusing on the efficiencies
defense.
V. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXPANDING THE EFFICIENCIES
DEFENSE
A. Expanding Efficiencies in Health Care
The court’s treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s shows the
tension between the ACA’s incentives to consolidate and enforcement of

57

Id. at 788.

58

Id. at 791.

Id. at 790 (citing United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)).

59

60

Id. (citing H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 720, 722).

61

Id. at 791.

62

Id.

63

Id. at 791–92.
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antitrust law. 64
Case law indicates that efficiencies must be
“extraordinary” to overcome a plaintiff’s prima facie case in highly
concentrated markets. 65 Using St. Luke’s and related cases, many scholars
call for a change in the way courts analyze merger efficiencies in the
healthcare sphere, contending that the Section 7 standard should be
updated to reflect the current state of the industry. 66 The court’s skeptical
treatment of efficiencies in St. Luke’s is critical to this argument. As
Professors Blair, Durrance, and Sokol posit, “[t]he lack of economically
informed case law in St. Luke’s is a missed opportunity to clarify merger
law.” 67 According to these professors, instead of implementing an
empirical analysis of physician acquisition, the court abstained from
engaging in a robust discussion of efficiencies. 68
Using St. Luke’s to demonstrate a lack of substantive analysis,
scholars argue that guidance of the efficiencies defense would lead to
consistent treatment by the courts and subsequently provide clarity for
parties seeking to merge. 69 To bolster the command for more expansive
treatment of efficiencies, such scholars rely both on the quality component
of healthcare mergers and the ACA’s incentives for health systems to
consolidate.

Bernard W. Archbold, Analyzing Qualitative Efficiencies in the Ninth Circuit’s St. Luke’s
Decision: A Defense of Non-Price, Qualitative Efficiencies, 27 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 343, 369
(2017); Jamie L. Bjorklund, St. Alphonsus Medical Center v. St. Luke’s Health System: The
Uncertain Application of the Efficiencies Defense is Leading to Unpredictable Outcomes in Healthcare
Mergers, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 577, 610 (2017).
64

65

St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 790.

66 See Bjorklund, supra

note 64, at 614; Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, Quality-Enhancing
Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1972 (2015); Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 359.
Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance & D. Daniel Sokol, Hospital Mergers and
Economic Efficiency, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016).

67

68

Id. at 38.

69

Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 616–17; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 3.

748

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 19

B. Distinct Health Care Market & Quality
Academia urging for stronger analysis of efficiencies hinges on the
fact that quality is integral to the delivery of healthcare services, and
mergers may enhance quality of care. 70 Thus, courts should treat the
antitrust analysis differently where healthcare mergers are at issue. These
scholars purport that health care is distinct from other industries, and
lumping it with other commerce places too much emphasis on cost and
not enough on quality. 71 Currently, courts rarely identify quality as a
substantive component of their analysis. 72 In their study of the use of
quality in antitrust cases, Professors Hammer and Sage found little
evidence of courts using empirical quality considerations from healthcare
research or literature. 73 Their research concluded that the lack of quality
analysis is due in part to a fragmented definition of quality. 74 Antitrust law
discusses quality in terms of the trade-offs with traditional price
concerns. 75 Conversely, “health care professionals tend to view quality as
the outcome of a medical process . . . divorced from economic context.” 76
Because of the lack of clarity in quality analysis, “antitrust law often
relegates quality and non-price considerations to a secondary position.” 77
Indeed, both the Agencies and courts lend greater weight and
discussion to price, which according to Professors Blair and Sokol,
“creat[es] a false distinction between price and quality” and discounts the

See Archbold, supra note 64, at 343–44; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 34–
39; Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 350.
70

71

Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 363.

Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 587; Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health
Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 547 (2002).
72

73

Hammer & Sage, supra note 72, at 609.

74

Id.

75

Id. at 556.

76

Id.

77

Id. at 547.
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quality of care provided by the merged entity. 78 Healthcare mergers,
however, can produce non-price efficiencies such as “offering integrated
care, tertiary care, more services, and better specialists,” which ultimately
allow merging entities to be more competitive. 79 Blair argues that “[f]irms
compete on quality in health care as fiercely as they may on price,” and
consumers take quality into consideration when deciding where to receive
services. 80 “Thus, when quality improves, consumers are willing to pay
more for the same quantity of the good.” 81 By this logic, even if a merger
does not successfully bring down prices, the quality gained by way of the
merger may be sufficient to render the merger procompetitive.
These scholars contend that, to fully account for the quality
advances of mergers, courts should lend more weight to quality via the
efficiencies defense. 82 Where courts discuss efficiencies, they do so in
terms of price measurements and shy away from substantive quality
discussions. 83 Because of the lack of analytical framework for courts to
discuss quality, uncertainty is perpetuated both for courts and businesses. 84
In her article, Kristin Madison argues that a measurable definition of
quality will allow litigants to better support their arguments and will

78

Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1971; see also Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 580.

79

Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615.

80

Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 44.

81

Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1975.

82

Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615.

See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1093 (N.D. Ill.
2012) (discussing cost-based efficiencies and finding that any proposed quality-based
efficiencies are wholly speculative); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Tenet Healthcare, 17 F. Supp.
2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (finding that cost-based efficiencies are speculative); Fed.
Trade Comm’n v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1307 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
(providing weight to cost-based efficiencies); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Freeman Hosp., 911
F. Supp. 1213, 1224 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (discussing efficiencies in terms of economies
reducing administrative and overhead costs).
83

84

Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 580; Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 70.
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provide certainty to businesses anticipating consolidation. 85 According to
the preceding arguments, courts should lend more weight to quality
analysis to account for merger efficiencies. 86 Such discussion will provide
guidance in the business world 87 and will bring antitrust law and the ACA
into alignment. 88
C. ACA & Incentives to Consolidate
Other scholars look to the ACA itself as affirmation that a more
flexible standard should govern healthcare consolidation. 89 The ACA
sought to mitigate the problems accompanying a fragmented system of
health services and to improve overall access and quality. 90 Some scholars
argue that the ACA specifically envisioned consolidation 91 as a means to
Kristin Madison, Hospital Mergers in an Era of Quality Improvement, 7 Hous. J. Health L.
& Pol’y 265, 298–99 (2007).
85

See generally Archbold, supra note 64, at 372; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 615; Blair &
Sokol, supra note 66, at 1984; Ebraheim, supra note 13, at 360–63.
86

See Archbold, supra note 64, at 374; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 581 (arguing for a
“certain and consistent application of the efficiencies defense” to “provid[e] a framework
for healthcare entities seeking to merge”); Blair & Sokol, supra note 66, at 1995 (arguing
that a more robust analysis of quality would help improve business planning).
87

See Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 618 (“[r]eexamining how healthcare mergers will be
assessed will bring antitrust law into accord with current healthcare policy . . . ”).
88

See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, The Double-Edged Sword of Health Care
Integration: Consolidation and Cost Control, 92 IND. L.J. 55, 62–63 (2016); Howard, supra note
4, at 83–86; Leigh L. Oliver & Robert F. Leibenluft, A Mixed Bag: Sorting out Efficiencies
Arguments in Hospital Mergers, 30 ANTITRUST ABA 18, 18 (2015).
89

90

Greaney, supra note 8, at 60.

See The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s Impact on Competition, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial
and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 82 (2015) (statement of
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute); Terry L. Corbett,
Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need for Mission Primacy Through a New
Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH. L. REV. 103, 150–51 (2015); Greaney, supra
note 8, at 60; Marshall B. Kapp, Speculating about the Impact of Healthcare Industry Consolidation
on Long-Term Services and Supports, 25 Annals Health L. 1, 5 (2016).
91
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alleviate these problems by bringing down costs and aligning provider
incentives. 92 In his article on hospitals and antitrust scrutiny, Ross Bautista
went so far as to claim that integration is the best way to “reduce
fragmentation, increase efficiency, and thus [to] reduce costs.” 93
Specific consolidation drivers from the ACA include the move to
value-based purchasing, 94 which encompasses the creation of ACOs, as
previously discussed. The ACO program is the most explicit example of
the ACA incentivizing entities to integrate. ACOs, by definition, involve
multiple entities coming together for the purpose of delivering more
efficient care. 95 Vertical integration theoretically achieves the ACA’s costsaving goals. 96 More importantly, such integration could provide the
coordinated care that the healthcare system lacks. 97 Professor Thomas
Greaney pushes back against this argument, arguing that no part of the

92

Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 23–24.

Ross E. Bautista, The Never-Ending Quest for Clarity Amidst Uncertainty: Hospital M&A and
Antitrust Scrutiny, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 149, 156 (2017).

93

HEALTH CARE 2020, supra note 9. See also Jacqueline Belliveau, Value-Based Care, Price
Transparency Drive Hospital Mergers, REVCYCLE (Dec. 6, 2016), https://
revcycleintelligence.com/news/value-based-care-price-transparency-drive-hospitalmergers.
94

124 Stat. 119, § 1899. ACOs are networks of health care providers that work together
to provide health services to at least 5,000 patients for at least 3 years. ACOs agree to be
held accountable for providing quality services, and they share in the cost savings they
achieve. Id.

95

96

Kapp, supra note 91, at 12.

97

Id.
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ACA explicitly encourages such integration. 98 Greaney calls these
scholars’ arguments the “ACA-made-me-do-it defense.” 99
Nevertheless, the proponents of expanded efficiencies analysis
turn to the ACA as the primary source of legislative intent to encourage
mergers for the purpose of increasing efficiencies within the industry. 100
According to these arguments, not only do mergers and acquisitions have
the potential to increase quality, but they can also achieve important cost
savings. 101 Finally, scholars argue that integration is vital to achieving the
ACA’s quality and cost-savings goals. 102 Given the ACA’s efficiency
incentives, these arguments refute a restricted standard that fails to fully
account for both quality and cost components of the efficiencies defense.
VI.

ARGUMENTS FOR CONSTRAINING EFFICIENCIES

Despite the preceding arguments for robust and favorable analysis
of the efficiencies defense, courts are properly analyzing efficiencies for a
variety of reasons. First, such arguments omit discussion of the potential
dangers of healthcare mergers to exclude rivals and to circumvent selfreferral legislation. In addition, merged entities within the healthcare
system typically gain market power and the ability to exploit prices.
Moreover, empirical research on integrated health systems has consistently

The State of Competition in the Health Care Marketplace: The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act’s Impact on Competition, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial
and Antitrust Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 114th Cong. 23 (2015) (statement of
Thomas L. Greaney, Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law).
98

Id. In Greaney’s view, the ACA sought to improve market competition by establishing
health insurance exchanges to facilitate consumer comparison shopping and by requiring
the insurance companies to maintain a minimum level of coverage. Id. at 18–20.
Furthermore, the provider incentives promulgated by the ACA rely on competition “to
drive cost containment and quality improvement.” Id.

99

100

See Archbold, supra note 64, at 369.

See, e.g., Archbold, supra note 64, at 344; Bjorklund, supra note 64, at 583; Ebraheim,
supra note 13, at 350.
101

102

See Corbett, supra note 91, at 159; Kapp, supra note 91, at 13–14.
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found that consolidation does not enhance quality of care. Finally,
scholars who argue for more expansive treatment of the efficiencies
defense inflate the degree to which the Agencies attack mergers in the
healthcare industry. For these reasons explored below, courts are properly
construing the efficiencies defense.
A. Potential for Exclusion of Rivals & Facilitation of Referrals
First, courts are correctly giving limited analysis to the efficiencies
defense because of the potential dangers healthcare mergers pose,
including facilitation of referrals, foreclosure of competition, and raising
of prices above competitive levels. 103 These harms are exacerbated when
there are high entry barriers and where mergers occur in highly
concentrated markets, as is often the case in hospital markets. 104 In the
healthcare setting, the potential for such dangers is further amplified by
other factors, such as bundling hospital and physician services, as in St.
Luke’s. Such merger harms complicate healthcare marketplaces in several
ways.
First, integrating physician groups within a larger hospital system
facilitates the referrals of patients within a single network. 105 When
hospitals contract directly with physicians, they may use the relationship
to “increase admissions, diagnostic testing, and outpatient services at their

MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at §§ 1–2. See also Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at
323–24 (finding that the foremost “vice” of a vertical merger is “foreclosing the
competitors of either party from a segment of the market . . .”). For a thorough
explanation of foreclosure via mergers, see Greaney & Ross, supra note 35, at 216, 221,
226.
103

MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, §§ 5.3, 9. See also David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott
Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1964, 1966
(2013).

104

105

Brown & King, supra note 89, at 72–73.
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facilities.” 106 Such referrals allow physicians to skirt the Anti-Kickback
Statute 107 and the Stark Law, 108 two regulatory safeguards against selfreferrals. 109 These laws “afford broad leeway with regard to referrals by
employed physicians,” which makes it easier for integrated health systems
to circumvent the statutes’ prohibitions. 110 Such referrals also have the
ability to foreclose competitors from obtaining patients within the
market. 111 Physician practices owned by larger networks therefore have
the competitive edge over independent groups that must fight to bring in
patients.
Second, large entities post-merger may foreclose competition and
subsequently raise prices above competitive levels. 112 This danger is
amplified in the healthcare setting, where marketplaces are already
concentrated. 113 A study by David Cutler and Fiona Morton of hospital
market share and consolidation found that, in 2010, half of all hospital
markets were highly concentrated. 114 Another third were moderately

106 Laurence C. Baker, M. Kate Bundorf & Daniel P. Kessler, Vertical Integration: Hospital
Ownership of Physician Practices is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, HEALTH AFFAIRS,
May 2014, https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff. 2013.1279.

42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2018). The Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal liability for
an individual or entity that solicits or receives remuneration in return for or to induce
referrals or services reimbursable by the federal government. Id.
107

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2018). The Stark Law prohibits a physician from referring to an
entity for a designated health service if the physician has a financial relationship with that
entity. Id.
108

109

42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(e).

Greaney & Ross, supra note 35, at 212; see 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)–(e) (providing
exceptions to liability, including those for employees and for hospital ownership); see also
Brown & King, supra note 89, at 72–73.
110

111

Blair, Durrance & Sokol, supra note 67, at 28.

112

See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, §§ 6–7.

113

See Cutler & Morton, supra note 104.

Id. Cutler & Morton examined data from the American Hospital Association, focusing
on “nonfederal, short-term general and specialty hospitals that have facilities and services

114
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concentrated, leaving only the remaining sixth un-concentrated. 115 This
concentration allows a dominating entity to wield market power and raise
prices, as discussed below in Subsection B. Furthermore, because of the
power of integrated systems, physician groups are increasingly integrating
within larger systems to maintain financial stability and to gain leverage
against insurance companies. 116 Folding to the power of larger health
systems further adds to market concentration, causing less competition in
the overall marketplace and allowing the larger systems to maintain market
power against remaining independent groups. Where there is appreciable
danger for anticompetitive consequences, courts properly impose a high
burden on defendants to defeat a presumption that a merger is
anticompetitive. Courts should therefore refrain from expanding the
efficiencies defense.
B. Market Power & Price Increases
Another danger of consolidation that rebuts scholars’ argument
for merger efficiencies is that the merged entity can charge higher prices
by gaining bargaining leverage over insurance companies to demand
higher reimbursement rates. 117 Studies show that hospital networks have
stronger leverage than any provider groups because of their size and
patient volume, and so-called “must have” hospitals charge higher prices
than other hospitals within the same marketplace. 118 Ostensibly,
countervailing the power of insurers is beneficial to the overall hospital
market; however, when the market becomes dominated by a large

available to the public.” Id. at 1964. They analyzed market information from 306 hospital
referral regions across the county. Id. Cutler and Morton turned to share of admissions
and HHI to discuss the competitive market of the regions. Id.
115

Id. at 1966.

116

See Baker, Bundorf & Kessler, supra note 106.

117

Id. at 757.

118 Chapin White, Amelia Bond, & James Reschovsky, High and Varying Prices for Privately
Insured Patients Underscore Hospital Market Power, 27 CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH
SYSTEM CHANGE 4 (Sept. 2013).
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integrated system, that system alone has the ability to charge higher prices,
and independent hospitals and provider groups in the same market have
no leverage to command the same. 119 The disjointed power thus causes
wide price variations amongst the prices insurers pay hospitals. 120
A study conducted by Chapin White showed as much as a 60%
variation between the prices insurers pay to the most- and the leastexpensive hospitals in a given market. 121 The study further found that
such differences were not attributable to labor costs, complexity of
services, type of coverage, or whether the hospital had teaching
programs. 122 According to the study, such variation resulted from market

Jennifer R. Conners, A Critical Misdiagnosis: How Courts Underestimate the Anticompetitive
Implications of Hospital Mergers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 543, 553 (2003).
119

120

See generally White, Bond, & Reschovsky, supra note 118.

Id. at 2. For comparison, the study found little variation amongst primary care
physician prices. This lack of variation correlates with the lack of market power primary
care physicians possess. Physicians traditionally operate under solo or small group
practices, and they are therefore more “substitutable” to the insurance companies. Id. at
3.
121

Id. Massachusetts Attorney General also concluded similar results in a state-wide study
committed to determining the causes of price variation. MASS. ATT’Y GEN., REP. FOR
ANNUAL PUBLIC HEARING UNDER G.L. C. 118G, § 6½(B) (2010). In the report, the AG
found that prices paid by health insurers to hospitals and physician groups varied
significantly within the same geographic area and amongst providers that offered similar
service. Id. at 3. Further, these variations were not attributable to the quality of care
provided, the sickness of the population, the complexity of services, how many patients
relied on Medicare or Medicaid, or whether the provider was in an academic facility. Id.
The study concluded that price variations correlated to market leverage. Id. at 4. A similar
study was conducted by T. Scott Thompson in California, where concentration and
insurance premiums varied considerably amongst the regional divides. See generally T.
Scott Thompson, ACA Exchange Premiums and Hospital Concentration in California,
ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE 27 (Jan. 2015). Thompson concluded that there
was a clear positive relationship between insurance premiums and HHI increases. Id. at
30. Importantly, the least concentrated areas that had more than 5 competitors in the
region had lower average premiums. Id.
122
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power. 123 Another study found that hospital prices in monopoly markets
were more than 15% higher than in areas with four or more
competitors. 124 Statewide studies of hospital systems also find a positive
correlation between market power and price increases. 125
Research further supports that patients ultimately bear the cost of
these higher rates. 126 A study conducted by Professor Jeff Goldsmith on
health care integrated delivery networks found that per patient
expenditures in hospital systems and multihospital systems are 10-20%
higher than in independent groups, which adds up to $1,200-$1,700 more
per patient, per year. 127 Prices increases are particularly dangerous when a
merger-to-monopoly occurs, eliminating all competition in a given market.
The cost of an inpatient stay at a hospital in a monopoly market is $1,900
higher than markets with four or more competitors. 128 Given the
extensive data supporting price variation and market power, “[p]roposed
hospital consolidation should be scrutinized carefully to ensure that
competition is protected and that patients and payors are unlikely to suffer
from price increases.” 129
C. Consolidation Does Not Lead to Quality Improvement
Another reason to maintain skepticism of the efficiencies defense
is that there is little empirical evidence that consolidation actually enhances
quality of care, as merging parties often argue. According to the DOJ,

123

White, Bond, & Reschovsky, supra note 118, at 3.

Catherine Sampson, FTC: Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions May Create Monopolies,
REVCYCLE INTELLIGENCE (May 24, 2016), https://revcycleintelligence.com/news/ftchospital-mergers-and-acquisitions-may-create-monopolies.
124

125

See, e.g., Mass. AG, supra note 122; T. Scott Thompson, supra note 122.

See Jeff Goldsmith, et al., Integrated Delivery Networks: In Search of Benefits and Market
Effects, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 27–28 (Feb. 2015).
126

127

Id. at 12.
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Sampson, supra note 124(quoting Edith Ramirez, F.T.C. Chair).

129

Thompson, supra note 122, at 33.
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“most studies find that increased hospital concentration is associated with
increased prices.” 130 Furthermore, “[e]ven if a hospital merger is likely to
create cognizable efficiencies, those cognizable efficiencies likely will not
be sufficient to reverse a hospital merger’s potential to harm consumers
in the relevant market.” 131
A growing number of studies suggest that integration has little
bearing on quality and instead leads to increased expenditures for
patients. 132 According to the Goldsmith study, there is “scant evidence in
the literature of either societal benefits or advantages accruing to providers
from [integrated delivery network] formation.” 133 Conversely, “there is
growing evidence that hospital-physician integration has raised physician
costs, hospital prices and per capita medical care spending.” 134 Moreover,
hospital mergers have the potential to lower the quality of care, because
lack of competition obviates hospitals’ incentives to innovate and compete
over the non-price elements of patient care. 135 These findings do not
suggest that quality is a key component of healthcare consolidation, but

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND F.T.C., IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE OF
COMPETITION-Report by F.T.C and U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 25, 2015) (discussing that
some studies find that merged parties have lower costs, and how one study in particular
found that cost savings varies depending on the extent of consolidation).
130

131

Id.

Data Brief, Impact of Hospital Consolidation on Health Insurance Premiums, AMERICA’S
HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS 2 (June 2015), https://www.ahip.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/06/ProviderConsolidation_DataBrief_6.25.15.pdf. See also Marina Lao,
Francine Lafontaine, & Debbie Feinstein, Not just an opinion: competition really is key to healthy
health care markets, F.T.C. (Jul. 8, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/
blogs/competition-matters/2015/07/not-just-opinion-competition-really-key-healthyhealth.
132

133

Goldsmith, et al., supra note 126, at 2.

Id. According to the data, integrated delivery systems’ flagship hospital services are
more expensive on two levels: on a cost-per-case basis as well as a total-cost-of-care basis
than the services of their most significant in-market competitor. Id at 27–28.
134

135

Conners, supra note 119, at 549–50.
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rather that market power and removal of competition primarily motivates
such consolidation. 136
Other studies also find no measurable correlation between price
and quality. 137 A report to Congress from the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) concludes that price increases
do not indicate quality advancements. 138 According to the OECD, the
U.S. spends more on health care than any of the other 33 member
countries of the OECD. 139 Despite such spending, the U.S. lags behind
other countries in numerous quality measures. For example, the U.S.
ranks 26th in life expectancy and 31st in infant survival rates. 140 Although
the quality of care has steadily increased in the U.S., it does so at a slower
pace than the other OECD countries. 141 Edith Ramirez, the FTC Chair,
proposed that competition is essential to quality of care, because hospitals
compete to attract patients, and such competition leads to better price and
quality benefits for consumers. 142 Thus, competition, not consolidation,
leads to cost and quality benefits for consumers. Taken together, this

136

Data Brief, supra note 132.

137 See Examining Consolidation in the Health Insurance Industry and its Impact on Consumers:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the Subcomm. on
the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015) (statement of Paul B. Ginsburg, Norman Topping
Chair in Medicine and Public Policy, Sol Price School of Public Policy); MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy 6 (Mar. 2014).
138

MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 137, at 29.

139

Id. at 28.

140

Id.

Id. See also Rabah Kamal and Cynthia Cox, How has the quality of the US healthcare system
changed over time? PETERSON-KAISER HEALTH SYSTEM TRACKER (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chart-collection/quality-us-healthcare-systemchanged-time/?_sf_s=measuring+quality#item-mortality-rates-endocrine-nutritionalmetabolic-diseases-fallen-last-15-years-u-s.
141
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Sampson, supra note 124(quoting Edith Ramirez, F.T.C. Chair).
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research suggests that rigorous enforcement of antitrust laws is crucial in
maintaining healthcare quality.
D. Scholars Inflate Degree of Merger Scrutiny
Finally, scholars arguing for expanded analysis of efficiencies fail
to take into account that the Agencies conduct an extensive multi-step
review before bringing suit. 143 After such review, the vast majority of
mergers may proceed. 144 In 2016, 1,832 transactions were reported to the
Agencies. 145 Of these transactions, the Agencies brought challenges to 47,
or 2%. 146 This percentage suggests that the Agencies only brings
enforcement actions to mergers that have an appreciable danger of being
anticompetitive. Moreover, the Agencies have the ability to examine
merger efficiencies during the review and can abstain from challenging the
merger if they find that such efficiencies would overcome the potential for
anticompetitive consequences.
Furthermore, scholarly arguments do not discuss the placement of
the efficiencies defense within the broader burden-shifting framework
required by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The current standard is such
that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. 147 The plaintiff
has the onus to first obtain a presumption of anticompetitive harm. The
efficiencies defense comes into play only after the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing that the merger is likely to be anticompetitive. 148 Therefore,
once efficiencies are argued, there is already a strong likelihood of

Merger Review, F.T.C. (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/
mergers-and-competition/merger-review.

143

144

Id.

FTC, DOJ Issue Fiscal Year 2016 Hart Scott Rodino Premerger Notification Report, F.T.C.
(Oct. 4 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/10/ftc-doj-issuefiscal-year-2016-hart-scott-rodino-premerger.
145

146

Id.
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See Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d at 991.

148

See St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 788.
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anticompetitive consequences, and the defendant should have a high
burden of proof to rebut this presumption. Finally, for efficiencies to
succeed, they must be merger-specific, meaning that they cannot be
possible absent the merger. 149 This barrier ensures that parties do not
abuse their reliance on quality to justify otherwise anticompetitive
mergers. For these reasons, there is a strong argument to constrain the
use of the efficiencies defense.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The healthcare industry has undergone substantial change since
the ACA was passed. The high level of consolidation within the industry
and the subsequent lack of flexibility from the courts is a source of
frustration for scholars seeking to overcome obstacles to quality
improvement. Given the high concentration of the market and the
potential anticompetitive dangers of mergers, 150 it follows that courts are
properly constraining the efficiencies defense in favor of protecting
consumers from powerful entities. Restricting the use of the efficiencies
defense follows the empirical evidence, which shows that consolidation
tends to increase costs and has little bearing on quality. Despite
proponents’ arguments for expanding the use of efficiencies, courts
should maintain the current standard following the proposition that
competition is the best means to achieving low costs and high quality of
care.
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MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 29, at § 10; St. Luke’s, 778 F.3d at 790–91.

According to the Health Care Cost Institute, in 2017, the average hospital and system
HHIs were 1,984 and 2,969, respectively. Healthy Marketplace Index: Hospital Concentration
Index, HEALTH CARE COST INST. 2 (2017). “The higher system-level HHIs imply that
inpatient services are more concentrated at the system level than the hospital level.” Id.
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